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I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAS WITNESSED A MOVEMENT AWAY
from harsh, merciless justice, where prisons were for debtors and
all other criminals received some pitiful end, to a system where a
criminal is punished in proportion to his wrong. The concepts of double
jeopardy, due process and cruel and unusual punishment were
developed to protect criminal defendants from unjust and unduly
multiplied punishment. In time, the doctrine of merger arose to prevent
multiple punishment where only a single course of criminal conduct was
involved.
In terms of modern penal law, protection from legislatively unintend-
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ed judicial division of a single continuing offense has been the result of a
focus upon federal constitutional guarantees. These guarantees arise
from the double jeopardy clause, the due process clause of both the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, as well as the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.1 Each of the above protections
encompasses its own unique focus and logic. All are available as a shield
from undue multiplication of convictions. The Ohio Allied Offense
Statute2 is a codification of the common law doctrine of merger and is
the Ohio legislature's attempt to insulate criminal defendants from
harsh and absurd punishment. This Article discusses the relationship of
certain constitutional guarantees against multiple punishments to the
Allied Offense Statute and the multiple punishment controversy in
Ohio.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION AGAINST MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT
In general terms, the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution3 consists of three main protections: 1) it protects against a
second prosecution for the "same offense" after acquittal, 2) it protects
against a second prosecution for the "same offense" after conviction,4
and 3) it protects against the imposition of multiple punishments for the
"same offense."5 The federal double jeopardy clause serves principally
' It would seem that the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment would impose an upward limitation on the amount or type of
punishment which might be imposed for a single criminal episode or transaction.
Schwartz, Multiple Punishment for the "Same Offense ". Michigan Grapples With
The Definitional Problem, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 825, 844 n.120 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Schwartz].
2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25 (Page 1982).
' The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "INior
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Avoidance of multiple punishment was
foremost in the minds of the Constitution's draftsmen. Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262, 266 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy].
Section 10 of article I of the Constitution of Ohio provides: "No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." All states provide at least some pro-
tection against double jeopardy as a matter of state constitutional or common
law. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 154 n.9, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting).
Perhaps two of the most recognized exceptions to the general rule barring
reprosecution involve: 1) the retrial of a defendant following appellate reversal of
a conviction for the same offense, and 2) the right of both federal and state
authorities to try the defendant for the same crime. See United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
' Under early common law criminal procedure, each indictment resulted in a
separate trial and charges were not joined. It was only after the rules of criminal
procedure permitted joinder of charges in a single trial that multiple punishment
questions arose in the course of a single prosecution. See Twice in Jeopardy,
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as a restraint on courts' and prosecutors, and proceeds on the premise
that the legislature alone is vested with the power to define crimes and
fix punishments.
A. The Same Offense
The concept of double jeopardy is deeply rooted in our cultural
history. The belief that a person should not be punished twice for the
same transgression has been traced by legal historians to the civiliza-
tions of the Greeks and Romans, and to early Canon law.' Although
traceable to ancient times, the history of the double jeopardy doctrine
indicates that at different times the concept has had different and unset-
tled meanings. It has served different functions in the context of
developing and changing civilizations.8
supra note 3, at 266 n.13; Koch, Criminal Law-Multiple Punishment Under the
Organized Crime Control Act-A Need for Reexamination of Wharton's Rule
and Double Jeopardy, 52 WASH. L. REV. 142, 157 n.58 (1976). In Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that "[w]here consecutive
sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional
gurantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative
authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. at 165.
6 Because the fifth amendment double jeopardy guarantee protects against
multiple punishment and reprosecution for the "same offense," the fifth amend-
ment necessarily operates as a limitation on judicial interpretation of what con-
stitutes separate criminal offenses. See Note, Statutory Implementation of Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65
YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Implementation]. It pro-
hibits the imposition of punishment which was not authorized by the legislature
through the arbitrary practice of dividing one and the same offense into more
than one violation of the law. Id. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 826 n.3.
Double jeopardy principles found some expression in the DIGEST OF JUSTI-
NIAN. See generally Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
283 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Sigler]; Batchelder, Former Jeopardy, 17 AM. L.
REV. 735 (1883). Canon law disfavored placing a person twice in jeopardy, relying
upon the maxim that God does not punish twice. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121, 152 n.4 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
The idea that there are limitations on the number of times a person can be
punished for a single criminal episode or course of conduct transcends cultures
and is evidenced in the criminal systems of France, Germany, Switzerland and
Italy. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513, 538-41 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Kirchheimer].
8 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1975); Sigler, supra note 7, at
284.
One respected author has concluded that in England, prior to the 15th century,
the double jeopardy principle served mainly as a guard against abusive private
quasi-civil reprosecutions, not as a protection against actions by the state. Sigler,
supra note 7, at 293. The criminal law grew in part out of the right and duty of
private vengeance. M. RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 219-20, 237
(1936) [hereinafter cited as M. RADIN1.
The relationship between the civil law doctrine of res judicata and the
criminal law doctrine of double jeopardy has long been recognized. Jay v. State,
19821
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In more recent centuries, the protection against undue multiplication
of convictions has principally been afforded via the double jeopardy con-
cept. The protection involves a weighing and balancing of the substan-
tial interest of the state in obtaining punishment for every crime,
against the interest of the relatively powerless individual to be free
from undue threat and harassment at the hands of the state.' The
vestiges of modern double jeopardy precepts were developed by
English courts in state criminal prosecutions in recognition of the con-
siderable trial advantages enjoyed by the state and the severe punish-
ment imposed for conviction.'0 The courts, out of compassion for in-
dividuals who had already been acquitted, regularly rejected attempts
to reprosecute criminal defendants for the same offense.
Since the late 18th century, the development of the double jeopardy
doctrine has been marked by a relatively constant struggle between
criminal defendants, prosecutors, courts and legislatures concerning the
parameters of what constitutes a separately triable and punishable of-
fense. As death became the punishment for fewer and fewer crimes, and
as the number of statutory offenses grew, prosecutors were given some
incentive to divide a single criminal episode into several separately
punishable offenses." Consequently, many difficult double jeopardy
questions arose in two categories of cases: 1) cases where it was charged
that the defendant's conduct during a single criminal episode con-
stituted more than one violation of the same statute, 2 and 2) cases
15 Ala. App. 255, 258, 73 So. 137, 138 (1916); Note, Consecutive Sentences in
Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J.
916,919 n.16 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Consecutive Sentences]; Twice in Jeopardy,
supra note 3, at 296-99. Each doctrine involves the finality of judgments and the
proper and efficient use of judicial resources. The doctrine of res judicata is not,
however, within the scope of this Article.
' Double jeopardy principles attempt to equalize the adversary process by
permitting the state only one fair opportunity to convict an accused of a par-
ticular offense. Klafter & Henderson, Criminal Procedure, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 17, 38-39.
10 Under early common law practice, the accused never saw the indictment,
could call no witnesses and was not permitted counsel. Acquittals were very rare.
M. RADIN, supra note 8, at 228-29. Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple
Count-Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132, 133 n.1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Double
Jeopardy]. All serious crimes were punishable by death. Lesser offenses were
often punishable by amputation or disfigurement. See generally M. RADIN, supra
note 8, at 236-37.
See Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 342-43.
In determining whether a criminal transaction constituted more than one
offense, some writers and courts distinguished between "an offense continuous in
character" and "an offense that can be committed uno ictu." In re Snow, 120 U.S.
274, 286 (1887). Wharton commented that "[q]uestions frequently arise whether a
particular offence is divisible .... whether it is susceptible of being divided into
two or more offences, each to be open to a separate prosecution .... No matter
how long a time an offence may take in its perpetration, it continues but one
[Vol. 31: 295
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where it was charged that the defendant's criminal act or transaction
constituted separate violations of more than one statute.'3
In cases where the same statute was allegedly violated more than
once during a single criminal episode, early courts quite regularly
resolved the double jeopardy issue by deferring to the legislative power
to define crimes and prescribe punishments. Upon determination of the
unit of prosecution, i.e., conduct which the legislature proscribed as a
single punishable offense, courts rejected attempts by prosecutors to
subdivide what were deemed to be single but continuing offenses.
Where it appeared that the prosecution was relying upon the same
evidence to support more than one conviction, the courts determined
offence." 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 34-36 (Lewis ed. 1896). Elaborat-
ing on this analysis, Wharton further explained that "Itlhe test is whether the in-
dividual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute. If the
former, then each act is punishable separately." Id. at 36 n.3.
"3 Ohio's Allied Offense Statute on its face distinguishes between cases where
two or more statutes are simultaneously violated and cases where the statute or
statutes are successively violated. Subsection A of the Allied Offense Statute ap-
plies where the "same conduct" of the defendant gives rise to the charges,
whereas subsection B applies in other instances where the "conduct" of the
defendant gives rise to multiple charges. The origins of this analytical dichotomy
can be traced to theories of "formal" and "material" concurrence summarized
long ago by Wharton:
Formal concurrence, which exists when a particular act has several
criminal aspects. A particular sexual transaction, for instance, may be
both rape or incest. A stealing may be both larceny and an attempt.
Material concurrence, where several successive acts form part of the
same apparently continuous transaction.
In cases of formal concurrence, the rule, as has been seen, is, that
there should be a conviction only of the crime to which the higher penalty
is attached, though the minor crime may be taken into consideration in
adjusting punishment.
In cases of material concurrence the following theories have been pro-
pounded:-
1. Absorption or Merger.-By this view the lesser offence is lost
sight of in the greater. Poena major absorbent minorem. Only the most
heinous of the concurrent crimes is to be punished, and the others are
only to be considered as affording grounds for the adjustment of the
sentence. Against this view it is argued that it violates the public sense
of justice that any crime, proved in a court of justice, should go un-
punished, and that the commission of a greater crime should not be a
free pass to the commission of a lesser crime.
2. Cumulation.- Each distinct offence, though these follow each
other in rapid succession as part of the same transaction, is to be punished
separately, and for this is invoked the maxim, Quot delicta, tot poenae.
To this the objection is made that public justice is sufficiently satisfied if
the criminal has applied to him in his sentence such an increase of
punishment as the aggravation of the transaction requires, and that this
is one of the objects of giving to the judges discretion in the dispensing
of punishment.
F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 475, at 332 n.6 (8th ed. 1880)
(emphasis added).
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that multiple punishment was forbidden. In some cases it was not clear
whether the court's decision was founded upon principles of statutory
construction, principles of double jeopardy or both.14
The seminal case of Crepps v. Durden" was one of the first cases that
squarely confronted the multiple punishment issue in the context of a
continuing crime. In Crepps, a baker received four convictions for sell-
ing four loaves of bread on a Sunday. 6 Lord Mansfield, concluding that
the legislature did not intend to create an offense which could be com-
mitted more than once on the same day, reversed the sentencing court
for exceeding its province reasoning that:
If the Act of Parliament gives authority to levy but one penalty,
there is an end of the question, for there is no penalty at com-
mon law. On the construction of the Act of Parliament, the of-
fence is, exercising his ordinary "trade upon the Lord's Day;"
and that without any fractions of a day, hours, or minutes. It is
but one entire offence, whether longer or shorter in point of
duration; so, whether it consist of one, or of a number of par-
ticular acts. 7
In 1887, the United States Supreme Court discussed the multiple
punishment issue in a cohabitation case finding that the federal double
jeopardy clause precluded the prosecution from subdividing an in-
14 Some writers have criticized courts for failing to distinguish adequately be-
tween the question of statutory construction and the question of constitutional
law, but recognize that the questions are really the same. See, e.g., Hardin,
Criminal Law-Multiple Punishment Resulting From a Single Course of
Criminal Conduct, 25 ARK. L. REV. 181, 182 (1971). Where possible, courts will
generally avoid constitutional questions where some other legal theory is
dispositive of the case. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 12 (1978).
98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
16 Id. at 1284.
" Id. at 1287. In the famous case of Rex v. Vandercomb, 168 Eng. Rep. 455
(Crown 1796), the defendants were charged with burglary and were acquitted of
the charge on the technicality that the evidence showed that the burglary did not
actually take place on the exact date alleged in the indictment. The defendants
were reindicted and convicted for burglary, and their plea of former jeopardy
was rejected. The court determined that the acquittal on the first alleged offense
did not bar the prosecution for the second offense, which was properly alleged
and proven by the evidence. The court reasoned that "[i]f crimes are so distinct
that evidence of the one will not support the other, it is . . . inconsistent with
reason ... to say that they are so far the same that an acquittal of the one shall
be a bar to a prosecution for the other." Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
It has been pointed out that the "same evidence" test developed in Vander-
comb's case might not have come into existence but for the absurdity of strict
rules of common law pleading which required acquittal upon even a slight varia-
tion between the indictment and the proof. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note
3, at 270.
[Vol. 31: 295
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herently single and continuous offense by alleging that it was commit-
ted at different points in time.'8 The defendant in In re Snow 9 received
three convictions for criminal cohabitation" which occurred during a
continuous thirty-five month period. Finding that the division of the
period into three offenses was "wholly arbitrary," the Supreme Court
reversed the second and third convictions. In the course of its opinion,
the Court stated that "[t]he offence of cohabitation ... is, inherently, a
continuous offence, having duration; and not an offence consisting of an
isolated act .... [T]he rule has obtained that a continuing offence of the
character of the one in this case can be committed but once, for the pur-
poses of indictment or prosecution .... ,21
In apparent contrast to Snow, the Supreme Court in Ebeling v.
Morgan2  affirmed six individual convictions arising out of a continuous
criminal episode. The Court held that a defendant who cut open six
federal mailbags on the same day could constitutionally be convicted
and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment for cutting each
bag. 3 Since the case did not involve an offense of an inherently con-
tinuous nature, the Supreme Court rejected, on double jeopardy
grounds, the defendant's argument that the continuous nature of his
conduct, i.e., the sequential cutting of one bag after another, permitted
only one conviction.
2 4
The Court in Ebeling employed a same evidence test reasoning that
the prosecution offered different proof to support each conviction.
Snow, although reversing multiple convictions in a continuous conduct
context, is consistent with Ebeling as both cases turned on an examina-
tion of the legislatively intended unit of conviction. The statute in Snow
was framed as a single ongoing offense without temporal divisions
whereas the statute in Ebeling directed its force expressly against
tampering with individual items of federal property.
In the renowned case of Blockburger v. United States," the defendant
received three narcotics convictions arising out of two individual sales
of morphine. The Supreme Court, eventually affirming all three convic-
IS In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 286 (1887).
'9 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
o Snow was prosecuted under a statute which provided "[t]hat if any male
person .. .cohabits with more than one woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor ...." Id. at 275-76.
2, Id. at 281-82.
22 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
Ebeling was convicted of violating a statute which made it a federal offense
to "tear, cut, or otherwise injure any mail bag ... with intent to rob or steal ...
mail .... Id. at 629.
24 Id. at 631.
25 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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tions, determined that the two convictions for selling morphine, not in
its original package, did not violate double jeopardy because each con-
viction involved a separate sale on a separate day.2" The Blockburger
Court, later said to have been keenly aware of a legislative purpose to
crackdown on illegal narcotics trade,27 rejected the defendant's reliance
on Snow and his contention that the two sales were but a single con-
tinuous offense because the payment for the second sale was made
shortly after consummation of the first sale. Citing Wharton,28 the
Supreme Court analyzed the unit of prosecution prescribed by the Nar-
cotic Act and determined that the statute prohibited any sale rather
than the business of selling illegal drugs.29 The Blockburger analysis is
in harmony with both Snow and Ebeling.
26 The Harrison Narcotic Act made it "unlawful for any person to purchase,
sell, dispense, or distribute ... drugs ... except in the original stamped package
or from the original stamped package .... Id. at 300 n.1.
' Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 388-90 (1958).
28 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
284 U.S. at 302-03. In prescribing the punishment for a criminal episode the
politically responsible legislature is in the best position to evaluate the relative
importance which should attach to the legitimate goals of deterrence, retribution,
restraint and rehabilitation. Most double jeopardy controversies involve ques-
tions of legislative intent, not legislative power. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
U.S. 1 (1927), the Supreme Court stated that "[tihere is nothing in the Constitu-
tion which prevents Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the
consummation of a transaction which it has power to prohibit and punishing also
the completed transaction." Id. at 11.
In United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952), the defen-
dant and several of its supervisory personnel were charged with thirty-two
criminal violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although the government
asserted that an employer could be separately prosecuted for the violation of the
rights of each employee, the district court dismissed all but three charges finding
that it was "a course of conduct rather than the separate items in such course"
that constituted a violation of the statute. Id. at 220. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the district court, stating:
What Congress has made the allowable unit of prosecution-the only
issue before us-cannot be answered merely by a literal reading of the
penalizing sections. Generalities about statutory construction help us lit-
tle. They are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience.... They
do not solve the special difficulties in construing a particular statute.
The variables render every problem of statutory construction unique....
For that reason we may utilize, in construing a statute not unambiguous,
all the light relevantly shed upon the words and the clause and the
statute that express the purpose of Congress .... [W]e are asked here ...
to infer that an employer's failure to perform his obligations as to each
employee creates a separate criminal offense ....
It would be self deceptive to claim that only one answer is possible to
our problem. But the history of this legislation and the inexplicitness of
its language weigh against the Government's construction of a statute
that cannot be said to be decisively clear on its face one way or the
other.
Id. at 221-24.
[Vol. 31: 295
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In the early cases involving alleged violations of the same statute, the
courts resolved the double jeopardy-multiple punishment issue through
application of a legislative intent analysis. This analytical approach
recognized that the legislative power to define offenses includes the
power to prescribe the unit of prosecution." However, in cases involving
alleged violations of more than one statute, a different type of
legislative intent analysis was developed to resolve double jeopardy
questions. This analytical approach sought to establish legislative intent
to create separately punishable offenses by comparing the elements of
the statutes to determine whether the statutes in fact created theoret-
ically different offenses. Where courts concluded from the elements of
the different statutory crimes that the legislature had proscribed the
same offense in different ways, double jeopardy principles prohibited
more than one prosecution and punishment.
In Morey v. Commonwealth,31 the defendant was convicted of criminal
cohabitation during a continuous ten month period, and was subse-
quently convicted of criminal adultery on three separate days during
such period. Although proof of the same sexual conduct was admitted in
evidence at both trials, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rejected
the defendant's contention that he had been prosecuted and punished
twice for the same offense. The Morey court stated that "[a) single act
may be an offence against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution
and punishment under the other."32 Upon consideration of the evidence,
the court concluded that cohabitation and adultery were "distinct of-
fences growing out of the same act,' 33 because the conviction for
o Other early courts also deferred to legislative judgment in determining
whether the defendant violated the same statute more than once in the course of
a single criminal transaction. See Connecticut v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829)
(where separate convictions for the simultaneous possession of each of several
forged banknotes were disallowed); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 408
(1807) (where two separate convictions for receiving, at the same time and during
the same transaction, stolen goods owned by two different people were affirmed).
While the opinion has been expressed that strict adherence to the "legislative
intent" approach under double jeopardy law might lead to legislative abuse in the
creation of separately punishable offenses, the legislature is without authority to
prescribe cruel and unusual punishment. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 844. Compare
Kenimer v. State, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296 (1950) (finding the sentence im-
posed for 238 contempt convictions arising out of violation of a divorce decree to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment) with State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker,
48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896) (finding the sentence imposed for violating a
municipal ordinance 72 times within less than two hours to be cruel and unusual
punishment).
31108 Mass. 433 (1871).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
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adultery required evidence that the defendant was married and had sex-
ual relations with another woman while proof of cohabitation required
evidence that the defendant simply dwelt or lived with any woman to
whom he was not married. 4
In a factually similar setting, the defendant in the case of In re
Nielsen 5 was convicted in a federal court of criminally cohabitating with
two women during a continuous thirty-two month period. He was also
convicted of criminal adultery committed with one of the two women on
the date immediately following the period of cohabitation specified in
the first indictment. 6 Relying on the Morey decision, the district court
rejected the defendant's application for habeas corpus and concluded
that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court was reversed. At the
outset the Court determined, as a matter of federal law, that adultery
was an offense included within the statutory offense of cohabitation. As
a result, the Court held that the convictions violated the fifth amend-
ment because cohabitation and adultery were the same offense for
double jeopardy purposes, 7 and because the cohabitation charged in the
first indictment in fact continued up to and through the date of the
adultery. 8 The Nielsen Court approved but distinguished the Morey
decision on the ground that under Massachusetts law adultery was not
an offense included within the offense of cohabitation. 9
3, Id. at 435-36.
131 U.S. 176 (1889). Like the defendant in Snow, Nielsen was convicted of
violating a statute which made it a misdemeanor for a man to cohabit with more
than one woman. Id. at 176.
The adultery statute provided that "whoever commits adultery shall be
punished by imprisonment . .. not exceeding three years .... " Id. at 177.
Id. at 187.
In making its determination that the act of adultery was included within
the offense of cohabitation, the Supreme Court reasoned that the conviction for
cohabitation
was in law a conviction of a crime which was continuous, extending over
the whole period, including the time when the adultery was alleged to
have been committed. The petitioner's sentence, and the punishment he
underwent on the first indictment, was for that entire, continuous crime.
It included the adultery charged. To convict and punish him for that also
was a second conviction and punishment for the same offense.
Id. at 187.
Thus Nielsen established the rule that double jeopardy precludes separate
prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses, whether the conviction for
the greater precedes the conviction for the lesser, or vice versa. See Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977).
1 131 U.S. at 188. In Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), the
Supreme Court carried the Nielsen logic one step further by determining that
where application of the Morey test revealed that the defendant was not pros-
ecuted for both a greater and lesser included offense, neither prosecution
violated double jeopardy.
[Vol. 31: 295
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Through its decision in Nielsen, the Court demonstrated the relation-
ship between the principles followed in Snow and those announced in
Morey. In Snow the Court held that a single offense could not be sub-
divided into multiple violations of the same statute. The Nielsen Court
held that the "same offense" could not be subdivided into separate viola-
tions of separate statutes, where application of the rule announced in
Morey revealed that the defendant was prosecuted for both greater and
lesser included statutory offenses arising from the same conduct."
The defendant in Blockburger" was convicted of two narcotics of-
fenses arising out of one of the two sales he had made. Both convictions
were affirmed by the Supreme Court and the defendant's contention
that he was being punished twice for the same offense was rejected.42
The Court noted that one statute made it a crime to sell morphine not in
its original package, while the other statute made it a different crime to
sell morphine other than pursuant to a written order.43 Setting forth
what later became known as the Blockburger test, the Court explained:
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different ele-
ment. The applicable rule is that where the same act or transac-
tion constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two of-
fenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not."
Thus, courts established early two different types of double jeopardy
analyses for multiple offense cases. In cases involving a single statute,
such as Snow and Ebeling, the courts employed a relatively flexible
analysis that explicitly recognized that the resolution of same offense
and multiple punishment issues depended on resolution of questions of
legislative intent. In cases such as Morey and Blockburger, the courts
employed a relatively rigid type of analysis that implicitly measured
legislative intent to impose multiple punishment through comparison of
the elements of the different statutory crimes. In the years following
their adoption by the United States Supreme Court, these two types of
40 131 U.S. at 188-90.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
42 Id. at 303-04.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 304. In 1975, the Supreme Court characterized the Blockburger test as
one which serves the "function of identifying congressional intent to impose
separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or
transaction." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
In addition to the constitutional arguments, the defendant in Blockburger
asserted that as a matter of statutory law the legislature did not intend to
punish separately the violation of each section of the statute because both viola-
tions arose out of the same sale. This argument was given short shrift by the
Court. 284 U.S. at 304-05.
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double jeopardy analyses became a mainstay in federal courts and in
most state courts.45 This occurred notwithstanding the fact that each of
the two analyses presented the potential for successive trials and harsh
treatment of unpopular defendants when the theories were pressed to
" See generally Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 341-43.
Historically, Ohio courts are not unfamiliar with the double jeopardy-multiple
punishment controversy. Ohio courts have long employed a "same evidence"
analysis in resolving state double jeopardy issues. State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383,
106 N.E. 50 (1914) ("If the defendant upon the first charge could have been con-
victed of the offense in the second, then he has been in jeopardy." Id. at 387, 106
N.E. at 51). In Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924), the test was
expressed as follows:
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent
conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to
support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to war-
rant a conviction upon the other. A single act may be an offense against
two statutes; and if either statute requires proof of an additional fact, an
acquittal of the offense requiring proof of the additional fact does not ex-
empt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the statute
which does not require proof of such additional fact.
Id. at 657, 146 N.E. at 90.
For other Ohio cases treating the multiple punishment issue, see State v. Mar-
tin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 N.E.2d 776 (1951) ("[wlhen a single unlawful act results in
the killing of more than one person, each homicide constitutes a separate offense
for which the defendant may be tried without being twice put in jeopardy." Id. at
539, 96 N.E. 2d at 777); Dodge v. State, 124 Ohio St. 580, 180 N.E. 45 (1932) ("[tlhe
fact that a defendant has been put in jeopardy upon a trial for one criminal act is
no bar to a prosecution for a separate and distinct criminal act merely because
they are closely connected in point of time, place and circumstance." Id. at 580,
180 N.E.2d at 46); State v. Billotto, 104 Ohio St. 13, 135 N.E. 285 (1922) (killing
two people in the course of the same quarrel constitutes two separately triable
and punishable offenses); Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917)
(theft of different automobiles from different owners at "divers times and places"
constitutes separately punishable offenses under principles of double jeopardy);
Weaver v. State, 74 Ohio St. 53, 77 N.E. 273 (1906) (where in substance and effect
but one offense has been committed, a verdict of guilty by the jury under more
than one count does not require a retrial but only requires that the court not im-
pose more than one sentence); Woodford v. State, 1 Ohio St. 427 (1853) ("where an
offense forms but one transaction (and the jury finds the defendant guilty on
several counts) it is error in the court to sentence on each count separately." Id.
at 427).
In State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio St. 522, 172 N.E. 367 (1930), the defendants il-
legally transported the same intoxicating liquor from one county to another.
Following conviction in one county for illegal transportation of liquor, the defen-
dants were indicted on the same charge in the other county. The trial court sus-
tained the defendants' plea of former jeopardy and the supreme court affirmed. In
the course of its opinion, the court stated:
The fact that continuous transportation through several states may
be punishable in each state furnishes no persuasive argument that a like
transportation through several counties is punishable as a distinct and
separate offense in each county. The argument is fallacious and its con-
clusion not legally tenable .... Here there is a violation of but one law,
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their limits."8 The courts' continued reliance on these analyses as a
means of obtaining sensible and fair double jeopardy results was due in
large part both to the prudence of prosecutors who did not abuse defen-
dants by subdividing and repeatedly relitigating the same criminal
episode and to the relatively rare occurrence of harsh treatment. With
changing times, such judicial reliance came under increasing attack.
B. Changing Times
As the United States moved into the mid-twentieth century, the bat-
tle against domestic crime grew more intense. The rapid growth of
organized crime and the development of criminal syndicates created
greater challenges for law enforcement agencies in their attempts to
deal with the situation effectively. These problems were compounded by
the legislative allocation of societal resources to other seemingly more
important and pressing needs. However, legislatures did respond with
specialized and complex criminal legislation to better equip prosecutors
dealing with specialized and complex law enforcement problems. As a
consequence, the number of statutory offenses grew rapidly.
and defendants have already been sentenced for violating that law. The
offense is one against the state, and not against the county-one of its
subdivisions....
While the offender may be punished for transporting in either county
through which he transports, he cannot be placed in jeopardy in a second
county for the same act of continuous transportation. The crossing of a
county line creates no new offense; the line constitutes no part of the of-
fense; nor does it possess a single element characterizing it as such ....
We have in Ohio many laws penalizing single continuous offenses of this
character .... If a county line be crossed in a single continuous assault,
where the first blow is delivered upon one side and a second delivered
on the other side of the boundary line, or, if in his uninterrupted process
of hunting, a hunter should cross a county line, a single, not separate, of-
fense has been committed .... No court has ever held, nor, by the ut-
most stretch of judicial reasoning, could a court convert these "con-
tinuous and uninterrupted" acts into separate offenses against the state,
whereby the offender could be subjected to successive prosecutions for
the violation of but one law....
It is a well-known principle of law that an offense may not be split for
the purpose of prosecution.
Id. at 524-29, 172 N.E. at 368-69.
46 E.g., in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923), the
defendant was dealt approximately seventy-five hands in an illegal game of stud
poker. The court held that gambling on each hand was a separate offense, and
that a conviction for playing one hand could not constitute a bar to a subsequent
prosecution on another hand. Id. at 315, 256 S.W. at 389. In Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), the Court recognized that, historically, "state trials
have been employed as a formidable engine in the hands of a dominant ad-
ministration." Id. at 171.
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Statutory offenses were relatively broad in scope and few in number
when the Ebeling 7 and Blockburger48 analyses were developed. 9 With
the subsequent proliferation of complex and overlapping statutory of-
fenses, however, prosecutors were able to satisfy these offense-dis-
covering analyses and cull numerous offenses from the same criminal
episode. The courts continued reliance on these same evidence analyses
made successive prosecutions against the same defendant for
theoretically distinct offenses an increasingly more frequent occurrence.
The perceived erosion of the protection thought to have been afforded
by double jeopardy doctrine was not limited to prosecutions in federal
courts because most states had adopted the federal approach to resolv-
ing state double jeopardy questions.' Prosecutors were able to capital-
ize on the increase probabilities of obtaining a conviction by pleading
theoretically different crimes. 1 Prosecutors sought agreeable sentences
by trying the cases before different judges and seeking consecutive
sentences.52 Perhaps most significantly, continued strict reliance on the
same evidence analyses enabled prosecutors to badger some defendants
by subjecting them to successive prosecutions."
17 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
41 See generally Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 341-43.
Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 134.
5' Id. at 133.
52 English, Double Jeopardy-Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L. REV. 87,
88 (1971) [hereinafter cited as English].
Apart from the expense in time and resources, repeated prosecutions sub-
ject an accused to a heavy and continuing psychological burden of embarrass-
ment, insecurity and general anxiety. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1957).
Some prosecutors are able to better their positions in plea bargain negotia-
tions by carefully dividing a single episode into separate counts, thus making the
maximum potential sentence for conviction on all counts quite intimidating. Such
practices increase the potential that an innocent man might plead guilty on one
charge to avoid the risk of conviction on all. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3,
at 305.
In Heideman v. United States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1960), the prosecutor an-
nounced in open court there would be "no deals," and indicated he would seek a
maximum sixty-year sentence for six counts of illegal interstate transportation of
forged money orders. At a subsequent conference, the prosecutor allegedly prom-
ised to seek and obtain shorter sentences if the defendants pled guilty. After
they retracted their pleas of not guilty, the defendants were sentenced to con-
secutive terms of imprisonment totalling a minimum of twenty years. When the
defendants subsequently moved to withdraw the guilty pleas the trial court over-
ruled the motion without a hearing. The court of appeals determined that the
defendants' factual allegations, if substantiated, were sufficient to give rise to the
inference that "pressure by threat and enticement was improperly brought to
bear by the prosecutor in securing the guilty pleas." Id. at 808. Remanding the
case for further proceedings, the court of appeals went on to remark in dicta, that
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The abuse suffered by some defendants" at the hands of prosecutors
lead jurists and commentators to entertain grave doubts concerning the
continued validity of the same evidence tests.5 As the clamor for change
grew, some states abandoned the relatively permissive same offense
analyses and adopted a same transaction test as the state double jeop-
ardy standard." Through use of the same transaction test, courts effec-
tively compelled prosecutors to join all charges arising from a single
criminal transaction in a single trial. Thus, at least for some, the same
transaction test represented a workable means of ending the potentially
abusive reprosecutions permitted by both the Ebeling and Blockburger
analyses. 7
Although keenly aware of the criticism of the same evidence analyses,
the United States Supreme Court resisted defendants' attempts to
although the transportation of the six securities in one automobile at the same
time did constitute six separate offenses, "the use of multiple counts in a case
like the present one should not cause the actual degree of criminality in the act
charged to be exaggerated and magnified beyond reason." Id. at 809-10.
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959), described the "victims" of multiple prosecutions in the following terms:
Inevitably, the victims of such double prosecutions will most often be
the poor and the weak in our society, individuals without friends in high
places who can influence prosecutors not to try them again. The power
to try a second time will be used, as have all similar procedures, to make
scapegoats of helpless, political, religious, or racial minorities ....
Id. at 163.
' Commentators have pointed to conflicting decisions and confusing judicial
precedent in support of charges that the courts have failed to "confront the
underlying policies which the double jeopardy concept was intended to imple-
ment." Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 344-45. In his dissenting opin-
ion in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), Chief Justice Warren expressed
his dissatisfaction with existing offense-discovering tests:
The problem of multiple punishment is a vexing and recurring one....
In every instance the problem is to ascertain what the legislature in-
tended. . . . Normally these are not problems that receive explicit
legislative consideration. . . . Placing a case in a category of unit-of-
offense problems or the category of overlapping-statute problems may
point up the issue, but it does not resolve it.
Where the legislature has failed to make its intention manifest,
courts should proceed cautiously, remaining sensitive to the interests of
defendant and society alike. All relevant criteria must be considered and
the most useful aid will often be common sense.
Id. at 393-94. In a separate dissenting opinion in Gore, Justices Douglas and Black
expressed a willingness to overrule the Blockburger decision. Id. at 395.
See Double Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 134.
s The same transaction test operates more as a rule of compulsory joinder
than it does as a test which measures the number of separately punishable
offenses. Because the same transaction test operates to bar successive reprosecu-
tions, the test does not resolve questions of multiple punishment which might
linger after a single trial involving multiple counts. Theoretically, the Ebeling
and Blockburger analyses could be retained to resolve the multiple punishment
issue in such cases.
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employ the same transaction test in federal courts.58 While the Court
refused to abandon its rigid reliance on the analyses of Ebeling and
Blockburger, the Court was not completely unmindful of the plight of
those suffering abusive reprosecution in state and federal courts. In-
creasingly, the Supreme Court began to abandon its relatively conser-
vative and narrow view of the protection afforded by the federal double
jeopardy clause. Directly and indirectly, the Court extended and refined
other aspects of double jeopardy protection. 9
11 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 388-90 (1958).
The same transaction test was advocated as a replacement for the same
evidence test by Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall in a separate concurr-
ing opinion in Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454-55. The same transaction test is said to be
more in line with a layman's conception of fair play. English, supra note 52, at 92.
But it has been criticized as no real improvement over the same evidence test
because it is arguably subject to great manipulation. Horack, The Multiple Con-
sequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805, 818 (1937); see also in-
fra note 62 and accompanying text.
" In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), the Court indirectly extended
the reach of the double jeopardy clause in federal cases involving alleged multi-
ple violations of the same statutory provision. Building upon concepts employed
in Snow and Ebeling, the Court adopted a "rule of lenity" for use in federal cases
where the statute and legislative history failed to unambiguously define the
proper unit of prosecution for an offense. The Bell Court stated:
When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing it-when it
has the will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the unit of pros-
ecution .... When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of lenity. And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for
want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or an-
tisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to
resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition
of a harsher punishment. This in no way implies that language used in
criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common
sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to
be read. Nor does it assume that offenders against the law carefully read
the penal code before they embark on crime. It merely means that if
Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and
without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single trans-
action into multiple offenses ....
Id. at 83-84.
After Bell, the "rule of lenity" became a fixture in federal law and came to be
applied regularly by the courts as a last resort rule of construction to resolve
questions of legislative intent. In cases which withstood the constitutional
scrutiny of the Ebeling and Blockburger same evidence tests, the "rule of lenity"
was on occasion employed to resolve the question of whether Congress intended
to impose concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment for convictions aris-
ing out of a single criminal episode. See Consecutive Sentences, supra note 8, at
925-26.
But the "rule of lenity" is not a talisman which requires reversal in every case.
As pointed out by the Court in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961), the
"rule of lenity" is applied only in those instances where careful scrutiny of all the
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Some legal scholars, who were dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's
slow but deliberate response to the growing multiple prosecution prob-
lem, proposed statutory solutions to resolve the multiple punishment
controversy.' Commentators maintained that general legislative direc-
circumstances fails to reveal a clear legislative intent with respect to the ques-
tion at hand, whether it concerns the unit of prosecution or the mode of punish-
ment. Id. at 596-97. In Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), the defendant
was convicted of six narcotics violations arising out of two different sales of
heroin. With respect to each sale, it was charged that the drugs had been illegally
imported, that the sales were not legally made "in pursuance of a written order,"
and that the drugs were not legally sold "in the original stamped package or from
the original stamped package." Id. at 387. Rejecting the application of the "rule of
lenity" and affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court pointed out that "[b]oth
in the unfolding of the substantive provisions of law and in the scale of
punishments, Congress has manifested an attitude not of lenity but of severity
toward violation of the narcotics laws." Id. at 391.
Apart from the development of the "rule of lenity," the Supreme Court in
other ways extended the reach of the protection afforded by the fifth amend-
ment. In perhaps its boldest move, the Court in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), held that the federal double jeopardy clause was applicable to state court
prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it "represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage." Id. at
794. In so ruling, the Court abandoned its thirty-two year old decision in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The Benton decision was accorded full "retroac-
tive" effect in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
Although the Benton and Pearce decisions went far in bringing double jeop-
ardy protections in state courts up to federal constitutional standards, defen-
dants in both state and federal courts were still being subjected to vexing re-
prosecutions for single criminal episodes. The call for change reached a crescendo
in 1970, when the Court ruled for the first time that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel was a part of the double jeopardy protection afforded by the fifth
amendment. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that once an issue of ultimate fact has been properly determined between the
parties to a criminal prosecution, such issue cannot again be litigated in any
future lawsuit between such parties.
The Ashe decision provided prosecutors some incentive to simultaneously try
all charges involving the same factual issues or risk losing the ability to pros-
ecute unincluded charges in the event of an acquittal. But in cases where factual
issues were resolved in favor of the prosecution, the Ashe decision did little to
soften the potentially crushing blows of reprosecution permitted by the Supreme
Court's refusal to abandon the same evidence analyses. Thus, there remained in-
herent in the Ebeling and Blockburger analyses the potential for abuse long
criticized by laymen and lawyers.
' See generally Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 351-63; Note,
Double Jeopardy: Multiple Prosecutions Arising from the Same Transaction, 15
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 286-89 (1978); Kirchheimer, supra note 7, at 534-42;
American Law Institute, Administration of the Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy
128-29 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, § 22 (Official Draft 1935);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY ACT (1935); MODEL PENAL CODE,
§§ 1-4 (Tent. Draft 1953). However, courts have shown a tendency to disregard
statutory solutions to double jeopardy controversies. Kirchheimer, supra note 7,
at 531.
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tives should be designed to guide the courts and provide answers to
such questions as: 1) whether the conduct of the defendant constitutes a
single but continuing offense, 2) whether the number of victims affects
the seriousness of the offenses or requires multiple punishment, 3)
whether one offense consumes another, and 4) whether and under what
circumstances specific criminal statues displace the operation of general
criminal statutes."' The proponents of statutory solutions recognized the
delicate role played by the legislature in defining offenses for double
jeopardy purposes, and offered their theories as a means of guiding
courts in multiple punishment cases. While each statutory approach had
its advocates, most were criticized for real or perceived shortcomings.2
These shortcomings, and differences of opinion regarding the need for
statutory solutions, prevented the clear emergence of one test or for-
mulation as the preferred solution to all existing controversies.63 In the
context of these events, the Ohio General Assembly eventually enacted
the Allied Offense Statute.
III. MULTIPLE CONVICTION STATUTE IN OHIO: IS IT CLEAR?
The legislatures of many states, including Ohio, have for some time
been cognizant of the fact that the sovereign has demonstrated a
tendency to over-indict and over-prosecute some defendants. In some
states, statutes 4 have been enacted that foster the policy prohibiting
multiple convictions or consecutive sentences for a single criminal
episode. It is evident that these statutes are attempting to eliminate
multiple punishment where only a single unit of conviction should exist.
" See Statutory Implementation, supra note 6, at 367.
62 In some states, statutes have codified the "same transaction" test as a solu-
tion to the multiple prosecution problem. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West
1980 & Supp. 1982). Yet the same transaction test has many critics. While the
test might theoretically provide greater protection than the same evidence
analyses, the same transaction test is very arguably subject to judicial manipula-
tion.
The principal shortcoming of this approach is that any sequence of
conduct can be defined as an "act" or "transaction." An act or transac-
tion test itself determines nothing .... Whether any span of conduct is
an act depends entirely upon the verb in the question we ask. A man is
shaving. How many acts is he doing? Is shaving an act? Yes. Is changing
the blade in one's razor an act? Yes. Is applying the lather to one's face
an act? ... Yes, yes, yes.
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 276. For additional criticism, see English,
supra note 52, at 91-92.
1 However, in those jurisdictions which adopted an "act" or "transaction"
test, many courts moved to a "motivating intent" analysis to determine the scope
of a criminal transaction. See Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 607 (1960); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 3, at 275-76 n.62.
" E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25 (Page 1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 654
(West 1980 & Supp. 1982); 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 339 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.25(2) (McKinney 1975).
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The problem with such statutes is in describing precisely what con-
stitutes a single criminal act or episode.
Ohio adopted its multiple conviction statute, the Allied Offense
Statute, in 1974.65 Within a relatively short time after its enactment,
Ohio Revised Code section 2941.25 was frequently relied upon by defen-
dants facing multiple convictions. Within an equally short period, sec-
tion 2941.25 became a source of judicial conflict. Ohio courts differed
fundamentally in their approach to the multiple punishment contro-
versy. Section 2941.25 provides that a defendant can be convicted only
once "[wihere the same conduct by defendant can be construed to con-
stitute two or more allied offenses of similar import ... '66 This section
further provides that "[w]here defendant's conduct constitutes two or
more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two
or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or
with a separate animus as to each ... the defendant may be convicted of
all of them."'6
' 134 Ohio Laws 1994 (1972), codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25 (Page
1982).
66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A) (Page 1982) (emphasis added). The full
text of subsection (A) provides that "[w]here the same conduct by defendant can
be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the in-
dictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defen-
dant may be convicted of only one."
67 Id. at § 2941.25(B) (Page 1982) (emphasis added). The full text of subsection
(B) provides:
Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses
of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate
animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for
all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of them all.
From a procedural perspective, allied offense issues theoretically arise at two
different times in cases involving a single criminal episode. In cases where the
defendant is simultaneously tried on multiple counts involving allied offenses, the
allied offense issue does not arise until after guilty verdicts are returned by the
trier of facts on allied counts. Prior to return of the verdict, the multiple punish-
ment issue may be raised by motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
After return of the verdict, the allied offense statute operates as a "sentencing
vehicle" to resolve the multiple punishment issue prior to determination of the
sentence. State v. Kent, 68 Ohio App. 2d 151, 428 N.E.2d 453 (8th Dist. 1980)
(Cuyahoga County). Where the defendant is simultaneously tried on multiple
counts involving allied offenses, the trial court's disposition of the allied offense
issue is appealable upon journalization of the sentence.
In other cases where the defendant is successively tried for allied offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode, the allied offense issue arises, at the
earliest, prior to trial in the second prosecution. At the latest, the issue arises
prior to sentencing in the second prosecution. Where the defendant is successively
tried for allied offenses, a pretrial disposition of the allied offense issue in the sec-
ond prosecution is a final appealable order if the hearing upon the motion to
dismiss constitutes a "special proceeding" within the meaning of § 2505.02 of the
Ohio Revised Code. If the allied offense issue is not determined prior to trial in
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Many cases decided under Ohio Revised Code section 2941.25 are
distressingly inconsistent with each other, both in terms of their legal
analysis 8 and the divergent results reached on similar facts. The follow-
ing discussion focuses on whether the Allied Offense Statute can be the
subject of conflicting judicial results without being so vague as to offend
the due process clause 9 of the fourteenth amendment.
the second proceeding, the issue is appealable upon journalization of the sentence
in the second case.
Pursuant to § 3(B)(2) of article IV of the Ohio Constitution and § 2953.02 of the
Ohio Revised Code, the Ohio Court of Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to
review "judgments or final orders" of inferior courts within respective districts.
Generally, what constitutes a final order is statutorily defined. Section 2505.02 of
the Ohio Revised Code provides, in part, that "[ain order affecting a substantial
right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment,
(or] an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding . . . is a
final order which may be reviewed .... " (Emphasis added).
In State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St. 2d 254, 400 N.E.2d 897, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
852 (1980), the court held that a pretrial hearing upon a claim of double jeopardy
involved an issue entirely collateral to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
and should be considered a "special proceeding" within the meaning of § 2505.02.
The Thomas court further held that the pretrial ruling on the double jeopardy
issue was a final and appealable order. Although the analogy to the Thomas case
is less than perfect, a pretrial ruling upon an allied offense claim raised in a sec-
ond prosecution also involves an issue which is collateral to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant upon the second charge. There are substantial reasons for
treating such a pretrial ruling as a final appealable order. First, and foremost, it
is unfair to try a defendant for an offense upon which he cannot be convicted pur-
suant to § 2941.25. Second, trying a defendant for an offense upon which he can-
not be convicted wastes valuable judicial resources. Third, if the double jeopardy
and allied offense issues are simultaneously raised before trial in the second pro-
ceeding, simultaneous appeal of both issues would permit the court of appeals to
avoid resort to constitutional principles to resolve multiple punishment issues in
some cases.
If the allied offense issue is not brought to the attention of the trial court, but
is raised in the court of appeals, any error committed by the trial court in sent-
encing the defendant upon allied offenses is cognizable under the "plain error"
doctrine. See State v. Kent, 68 Ohio App. 2d 151, 428 N.E.2d 453 (8th Dist. 1980)
(Cuyahoga County); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 52.
" Compare State v. Mayfield, No. 40278 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 23,
1978) (Cuyahoga County) (pursuant to § 2941.25, kidnapping and rape merge
under the Blockburger test of double jeopardy) with State v. Keyes, No. 40328
(Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 1, 1980) (Cuyahoga County) (rape and kidnapping
are committed separately if rape occurs during transport in van). Compare State
v. Kent, 68 Ohio App. 2d 151, 428 N.E.2d 453 (8th Dist. 1980) (Cuyahoga County)
(issue of whether offenses merge is one of law for the court) with State v. Flynn,
No. 41208 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. July 31, 1980) (issue of whether offenses
merge is one of fact for the jury). All of the above cases expressly followed the
Allied Offense Statute.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
The literal language of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been given a substantial judicial gloss in ascertaining what process is due. For a
[Vol. 31: 295
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A. Traditional Tests of Clarity
Due process requires that criminal laws afford complete notice of
what the state forbids or commands. 0 It is well accepted that no person
can be expected to speculate as to the meaning of a law at the risk of his
life, liberty or property. In criminal cases, one focus of due process is
upon the personal right to not be held criminally liable for an act or con-
duct which no reasonable person would understand to have been pro-
scribed.7 ' This personal right is deeply engrained in our judicial system
through the directive that criminal laws be written with reasonably
ascertainable limits. 2
The Supreme Court has stated that it can be exceedingly difficult at
times to draw the line between permissible uncertainty in statutes and
the unconstitutional vagueness that would leave open to speculation the
conduct proscribed. 3 Though difficult to draw such a line, the Supreme
Court has admonished that the "standards of certainty in statutes
punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon
civil sanction for enforcement."" Therefore, when a court is faced with a
statute lacking full clarity, it must be mindful that its criminal proscrip-
tion requires a concomitant higher level of definiteness."
discussion of the development of "due process," see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385-410 (1978).
70 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
7, United States v. Ldub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
7 In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), the statute in
issue forbade willfully making any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in deal-
ing with any "necessaries." The Court found the statute impermissibly vague as
it did not forbid any specific or definite act, but left open to speculation the type
of conduct which would transgress the statute. Id. at 94-95.
The statute in Cohen was patently vague. However, not all vagueness prob-
lems need be so patent. Vagueness may become apparent only after repeated at-
tempts to place a judicial gloss upon the statute. Such near latent ambiguity is
equally as invidious and unfair as patent ambiguity. Cf. Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) ("[t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of
fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an
unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory
language." Id. at 352).
7 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
" Id. at 515.
70 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926):
[I]t will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the deci-
sions of the court, upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon
the conclusion that they employed words or phrases having a technical
or other special meaning, well enough known to enable those within
their reach to correctly apply them or a well-settled common-law mean-
ing, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which
estimates might differ ....
Id. at 391. See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), in which the Court held
that "[a] State may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal sanctions,
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The requirement of a higher level of certainty in criminal statutes is
not so stringent as to require absolute certainty in its terms.
Reasonable certainty is all that is required. Furthermore, a fundamental
precept of the due process doctrine is that a court reviewing a criminal
statute has a duty to give the statute a construction that would make
the statute constitutionally certain in meaning."6 It follows that if any
reasonable and practical construction can be given to the language of a
criminal statute, then the statute may not be held void for vagueness or
uncertainty." The Ohio Allied Statute may not be evaluated, however,
upon the mere backdrop of a judicial duty to reasonably construe the
statute. The statute must be inherently capable of a reasonable con-
struction. This latter requirement can only be satisfied through ade-
quate drafting of the penal law by the legislative body itself.
B. Legislative Bodies Define Crimes and Establish Punishments
The definition of a crime and determination of its punishment is
within the sole purview of the legislative body. As stated in United
States v. Wiltburger,8 "[iut is the legislature, not the Court, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its punishment." 9 Punishment is, after all,
the expression of society's disdain for certain acts or conduct. It
represents a retributive sentiment enacted pursuant to the then current
mores of society." It is well established that the legislature is the only
proper vehicle for expression of society's desire for deterrence,
restraint, retribution and rehabilitation."
The foregoing tenets of penal law apply with equal force in Ohio. The
in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of what conduct
might transgress them." Id. at 438.
76 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). The term "constitutionally
certain" is used to denote the difference between absolute certainty and that
degree of certainty which would place a reasonable person on notice of the
statute's scope of proscriptions.
" State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 200 N.E.2d 587 (7th Dist. 1963) (Columbia
County), aff'd, 176 Ohio St. 482, 200 N.E.2d 590 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 673
(1965). It must constantly be borne in mind, however, that the courts may not
search beyond the true, narrow intention of the legislature while attempting to
construe the statute with certainty. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76 (1820).
7' Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76.
7 Id. at 95.
s See generally Gerber & McAnny, Punishment: Current Survey of
Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 491 (1967).
"' See generally R. DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW
320-510 (1963). "[Plunishment is a conventional device for the expression of at-
titudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those 'in
whose name' the punishment is inflicted." J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 98
(1970).
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General Assembly has been given the power to create law by the Con-
stitution of Ohio; s" no such power was given to the courts. If the Allied
Offense Statute, as a "sentencing vehicle, ' 8 3 does not indicate the
proper circumstances under which two or more crimes are allied, and
are as such merged for purposes of conviction, then the state courts
have no power to create their own rules for levying the wrath of socie-
ty."4 The statutes must create the crime and its punishment. If a court
were to create its own punishments, they would be void ab initio.85 This
inherent limitation upon a court's power to construe criminal law was
established in the landmark decision of Crepps v. Durden.8 The rule of
82 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1.
83 State v. Kent, 68 Ohio App. 2d 151, 428 N.E.2d 453 (8th Dist. 1980)
(Cuyahoga County). "When we speak of the allied offense doctrine, we are speak-
ing of offenses for which an individual may be sentenced. In reality, the allied of-
fense statute is a sentencing vehicle." Id. at 154, 428 N.E.2d at 456.
Exactly what constitutes "a crime" or "several crimes" is one aspect of the
current Allied Offense Statute that often eludes reasonable ascertainment. Sec-
tion 2941.25 of the Ohio Revised Code provides cumulative convictions for "of-
fenses of dissimilar import" and for "same or similar kind [offenses] committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each ...." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2941.25(B) (Page 1982). Did the General Assembly intend the terms "separately"
and "separate animus" to be distinct alternatives between which a court might
arbitrarily choose, or did the General Assembly intend the term "separate
animus" to modify and define the scope of the term "separately"? One would cer-
tainly hope that the latter was intended. To allow a court to exercise unbridled
discretion to choose whether it would convict based upon how it viewed the time
sequence for particular conduct or upon how it viewed the intent of the actor
would be unreasonable. The Committee Comment to § 2941.25 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code indicates that a narrow construction of the statute was intended, a
construction which limits the units of conviction. "The basic thrust of the section
is to prevent 'shotgun' convictions." Id. The Comment also states that the section
permits convictions for offenses "committed at different times or with a separate
'ill will' as to each ...." Id. There is nothing in the statute or the Comment,
however, that clearly demonstrates that the General Assembly believed several
distinct, unassociated and insular "ill wills" could exist simultaneously where
only a single victim is involved. Therefore, the General Assembly must have in-
tended the terms "separately" and "separate animus" to be read in pari materia.
" Cf. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)
(Legislative authority must first make an act criminal, and then attach a punish-
ment.). Similarly, the Ohio Constitution vests the law-making power in the
General Assembly.
8 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777). English common law was specifically incor-
porated into Ohio common law in Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853):
The English common law, so far as it is reasonable in itself, suitable to
the condition and business of our people, and consistent with the letter
and spirit of our federal and state constitutions and statutes, has been
and is followed by our courts, and may be said to constitute a part of the
common law of Ohio.
Id. at 390. See also State v. McElhinney, 88 Ohio App. 431, 100 N.E.2d 273 (5th
Dist. 1950) (Delaware County). In a world of complex, statutory penal law, the
common law is heavily relied upon where,
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Crepps is that no court may fashion multiple convictions apart from the
legislative intent as to the proper unit of conviction. This is the rule in
Ohio as well. 7 If the Ohio Allied Offense Statute was enacted to prevent
shotgun convictions, then pursuant to Crepps, a court is duty bound to
recognize this intent.
The United States Supreme Court, relying particularly upon Crepps,
adopted the legislative intent test in construing the criminal cohabita-
tion statute in Snow.88 Judicial severance of a single course of criminal
conduct into separate crimes, merely because the crime continues over a
period of time, is "wholly arbitrary"89 where there is an absence of
specific legislative intent to so divide the continuous conduct. This rule,
which requires adherence to legislative definitions to determine units of
conviction, is a tenet of penal law well recognized by the Ohio Supreme
Court: "The authority of the General Assembly to define crimes and of-
fenses in this state and to determine what acts are essential to con-
stitute a violation of the statute is so well established that citation of
authority in support thereof is unnecessary.""
The Ohio Allied Offense Statute must be carefully construed in light
of Crepps and Snow. The statute should command case law that is con-
sistent and affords defendants fair notice of what conduct will result in
multiple punishment. The statute's progeny should not be frought with
irreconcilable divisions of conduct into separate convictions in some in-
stances but not in other analogous instances based merely upon the
court's arbitrary divisions into temporal units which provide a false
hook upon which courts may hang the cloak of separateness. The Ohio
Supreme Court's treatment of the Allied Offense Statute must be ex-
plored to determine first whether the statute is adequately clear in its
sentencing mandates, and secondly to determine whether the Ohio
Supreme Court has been true to longstanding tenets of penal law in its
application of the statute.
as is frequently the case, a statute merely restates some part of the com-
mon law, [and] this is a matter of great importance because the words
used in the statute may have a great body of common-law (sic] inter-
pretation which does not appear in the enactment itself, but will be
followed by the courts in deciding cases.
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1969).
' State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 239-40, 102 N.E.2d 233, 239 (1951).
120 U.S. 274 (1887).
Id. at 282. The defendant had received three consecutive convictions upon a
charge of cohabitation with seven women over a period of almost three years.
The Court recognized that the legislature could never have intended to vest the
judiciary with discretion to create its own units of conviction at will, even if the
division was into tidy annual units. Id. at 283-86.
o Healy, 156 Ohio St. at 239-40, 102 N.E.2d at 239.
9' Compare State v. Butts, No. 38836 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1979)
(Cuyahoga County) (fondling, as gross sexual imposition, separate from rape due
to consecutive sequence) with State v. Nash, No. 41450 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 25, 1980) (Cuyahoga County) (Allied Offense Statute merges gross sexual
imposition and rape into one continuous assaultive episode.).
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C. Ohio Multiple Conviction Cases:
A Clear Statute Could Underlie the Inconsistency
A clear statute could underlie inconsistent precedent, if constitu-
tionally clear means reasonably clear, not absolutely clear. Although the
Allied Offense Statute may have been somewhat inartfully drawn with
respect to its phrase "separately or with a separate animus,"92 the rule
of Crepps93 is that the legislature defines the unit of conviction. A unit
of conviction under the Allied Offense Statute should encompass con-
duct committed with a single continuous objective or purpose or animus
separate from other distinct purposes or objectives. This would consti-
tute a strict construction of the statute against the state and liberally in
favor of the defendant, a rule of construction properly recognized by the
Ohio Supreme Court. 4 The Ohio Supreme Court is not, however, follow-
ing this rule of construction in the present context. Instead, the court
has taken a course which has deviated toward infinite division of con-
tinuous conduct into multiple units of conviction based solely on lapse of
time. In Snow,95 the United States Supreme Court warned that such
judicial conduct can be arbitrary.
The first close examination and analysis of the Allied Offense Statute
by the Ohio Supreme Court was in State v. Logan.6 In Logan, the defen-
dant had been convicted of kidnapping and rape for having forced the
victim into an alley and down a stairwell, where he sexually assaulted
her. The supreme court, basing its decision upon section 2941.25(B),
reversed the kidnapping conviction reasoning that the defendant
possessed a single animus during the asportation and assaultive
episode. 7 The court read the Allied Offense Statute as requiring a two-
tier analysis: 1) under subsection (A), the offenses are allied if the
similarity of the elements of the crimes corresponds to "such a degree
that commission of the one offense will result in the commission of the
other";" and 2) "notwithstanding the fact that a defendant is charged
with two or more offenses of the same or similar kind he may be con-
victed of all of them if he committed them separately, or if he possessed
92 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(B) (Page 1982).
98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
14 State v. Merriweather, 64 Ohio St. 2d 57, 59, 413 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1980).
11 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
Id. at 135-36, 397 N.E.2d at 1352.
98 Id. at 128, 397 N.E.2d at 1348. The court went on to state that the protec-
tion of § 2941.25(A) of the Ohio Revised Code was available onl3 if the prosecu-
tion relied upon the "same conduct" to support the multiple convictions. Id. It is
not clear, however, what the court meant by "same conduct." Conduct is an amor-
phous term which courts cling to when they fail to accurately define unit of con-
viction. Conduct could, for example, be the slightest movement of a hand, or it
could be an illegal drag race through seven counties.
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a separate 'animus' as to each."99 The court recognized that the Allied
Offense Statute codified the common law doctrine of merger and at-
tempted to limit the scope of section 2941.25(B) by holding that "[w]here
an individual's immediate motive involves the commission of one of-
fense, but in the course of committing that crime he must, a priori, com-
mit another, then he may well possess but a single animus, and in that
event may be convicted of only one crime." ' The court in Logan
disallowed the multiple conviction and reversed the kidnapping convic-
tion because it recognized that the General Assembly required an ex-
amination of defendant's mental state, rather than a division of conduct
into sequential moments of time, in determining the proper unit of con-
viction.
After Logan, the supreme court began to excise any consideration of
separate animus and began to concentrate on ways to construe conduct
to make it separate. In State v. Ware,0 ' the court held that the defen-
dant committed kidnapping separately from rape where the defendant
enticed the victim to his house by letting her believe she could use his
phone. The court did not discuss how this differed from Logan where
the defendant, under the pretext of a drug sale, had coaxed the victim
to an alley, where the victim was raped. The court in Ware merely con-
cluded that the defendant's acts were separate because the episode took
longer to complete. 102 The court did not engage in the Snow analysis of
legislatively intended units of conviction." 3 The court did not attempt to
apply its own rule of construction that criminal statutes be construed
strictly against the state. Rather, it chose to ignore the requirement of a
separate animus and latched upon the statutory term "separately" to
justify multiple convictions notwithstanding the possibility that the
defendant had engaged in an extended course of conduct with sexual
assault as his only objective.
Once Ware had been decided, the Ohio Supreme Court apparently
determined that it could further multiply convictions if it declared that
"separate" meant any fractional moment of time between one bodily
movement and another. State v. Barnes,"4 one of the court's most cryp-
tic per curiam decisions, held that if any moment of time lapses between
Id. at 129, 397 N.E.2d at 1348.
10 Id. at 131, 397 N.E.2d at 1349. The court was obviously following the spirit
of Crepps and Snow as it stated: "[Riecognizing that in many cases a single
criminal act could constitute two or more similar crimes, the General Assembly
attempted to remedy this problem by enacting R.C. § 2941.25.. Id. at 130, 397
N.E.2d at 1349.
'0' 63 Ohio St. 2d 84, 406 N.E.2d 1112 (1980).
1 Id. at 87, 406 N.E.2d at 1114.
1 Recall that in Snow, the defendant's several convictions had been based
upon judicial slices of time into neat annual offenses. See supra text accompanying
notes 18-21.
'" 68 Ohio St. 2d 13, 427 N.E.2d 517 (1981).
[Vol. 31: 295
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss2/4
MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS
the defendant's sexual assault upon more than one orifice, then the acts
are per se separate and the defendant may be separately convicted." °5
The court in Barnes failed to examine, under the rape statute which
defined the offense, the legislatively intended unit of conviction."' Yet,
such analysis is clearly mandated by Crepps and Snow when the issue
before the court is multiple convictions based upon a continuous
assaultive episode. The court's sole focus was to construe the defendant's
acts as separate under the Allied Offense Statute in apparent disregard
for the rape statute itself. Just as in Crepps, where the Parliament in-
tended activity on Sunday not loaves of bread to represent the unit of
conviction, the General Assembly has made sexual conduct,1°7 not dif-
ferent areas of the body during an uninterrupted episode, the unit of
conviction.
The anomalous result in Barnes cannot be pinned on the failure of the
General Assembly to draft a clearer Allied Offense Statute. Section
2941.25 is constitutionally clear if used, as in Logan, with a focus on the
intent or animus of the actor. This interpretation would have the in-
herent effect of merging bits of conduct into criminal episodes which
would constitute units of conviction pursuant to the underlying criminal
offense statutes.
Notwithstanding the fact that the General Assembly's use of the
phrase "separately or with a separate animus" seems to have caused
judicial uncertainty as to the proper test to be employed in determining
the number of convictions, the Allied Offense Statute is easily saved by
employing the rule of lenity, also ignored in the present context by the
Ohio Supreme Court. The rule of lenity, established by Ohio statute'
and the United States Supreme Court in Bell v. United States,"9 re-
quires all ambiguities in a criminal statute to be resolved against the
judicial creation of multiple units of conviction. Barnes disregards this
rule by multiplying convictions to the maximum extent possible without
discussing the statutory language which created the offense.
Following the rule of lenity, the Supreme Court in Ladner v. United
States"' reversed multiple convictions even where the defendant's blast
of a shotgun hit two officers. The Court admonished that:
'o' Id. at 14, 427 N.E.2d at 519 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
' The Ohio rape statute forbids "sexual conduct with another not the spouse
of the offender .... " OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A) (Page 1982).
" "Sexual conduct" is defined as "vaginal intercourse between a male and a
female, and anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
regardless of sex." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (Page 1982).
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (Page 1982).
'1 349 U.S. 81 (1955). Accord State v. Merriweather, 64 Ohio St. 2d 57, 413
N.E.2d 790 (1980).
'10 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
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When choice has to be made between two readings of what con-
duct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should
not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous
implication."'
The objectionable part of Barnes is that it creates multiple units of con-
viction out of "sexual conduct" where the General Assembly never
clearly evidenced an intent, to so divide the conduct. The Allied Offense
Statute cannot be cured of any vagueness problem by using it to lever-
age multiple convictions out of criminal offense statutes by mechanically
using the term "separately" to focus upon infinitely smaller and smaller
sequences of muscular contractions, each of which repeatedly violates
the law." 2 The Allied Offense Statute, as a sentencing vehicle, must be
used with the statute defining the underlying offense to discern the
totality of conduct which constitutes a singular violation of the law. Then,
the court may consider whether there are several, distinct totalities of
conduct which could justify multiple convictions.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPLICATED THREE-TIER
ALLIED OFFENSE ANALYSIS
A. Brown v. Ohio
Since 1974, Ohio courts have looked both to the Allied Offense Statute
and the statute or statutes defining the substantive offenses in attempt-
ing to determine the unit of convictions in multiple-punishment cases.
However, as the cases demonstrate, the application of the Allied Of-
fense Statute by Ohio courts has been inconsistent and has produced
some seemingly harsh and contradictory results."3 Moreover, the
" Id. at 177-78, quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
"I Cf. Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) ("judicial enlargement of a
criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the com-
mon law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.") Id. at 352,
quoting Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941).
"I Compare State v. Nash, No. 41450 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1980)
(Cuyahoga County), and State v. Davis, No. 42610 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept.
24, 1981) (Cuyahoga County) (fondling immediately preceding or following rape
not committed with a separate animus), with State v. Moralevitz, 70 Ohio App. 2d
20, 433 N.E.2d 1280 (8th Dist. 1980) (Cuyahoga County) (three acts of fondling
committed separately). And compare State v. Torres, No. 34102 (Ohio 8th Dist.
Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1975) (Cuyahoga County) (three penetrations of same victim dur-
ing ten to fifteen minute episode of sexual conduct constitutes three separately
punishable rapes), with State v. Cartellone, No. 43711 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Dec. 3, 1981) (Cuyahoga County) (three shots fired at one intended victim con-
stitutes one punishable assault).
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judicial gloss placed upon the statute by some courts has arguably turn-
ed it into a prosecutorial sword. This gloss has also arguably thwarted
the avowed legislative purpose to prevent "shotgun" convictions. As con-
strued, the statute has compounded, rather than alleviated, the poten-
tial for injustice inherent in the traditional same evidence double
jeopardy offense-discovering analyses.
It appears that Ohio courts may continue to give varying interpreta-
tions to the Allied Offense Statute. A consitutional remedy may be
available, however, for some defendants who are multiply convicted at
one trial, or repeatedly prosecuted for crimes committed separately pur-
suant to section 2941.25(B). In one Ohio case involving a single and con-
tinuing offense, the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction
on federal double jeopardy grounds notwithstanding the Ohio Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the defendant committed two offenses
separately.""
In Brown v. Ohio,"5 the defendant stole a car and was caught nine
days later driving the vehicle in an adjoining county."6 He thereafter
pled guilty in the Willoughby Municipal Court to the charge of joyriding
in the City of Wickliffe on December 8, 1973, the date of his apprehen-
sion by Wickliffe police."7 The next day, he was formally charged in
East Cleveland with auto theft."1 8 Brown was indicted by the Cuyahoga
County Grand Jury for the theft,"9 and for joyriding,' 0 in the city of
East Cleveland on November 29, 1973, the date the car was stolen.
Thereafter, Brown pled guilty in the court of common pleas to auto theft
with the understanding that the trial court would entertain a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea prior to sentencing on double jeopardy
grounds. 2' The charge of joyriding was nolled and dismissed. In support
of his motion to withdraw the plea, Brown asserted that his conduct
with respect to the same stolen car constituted but one essentially con-
'.. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
115 Id.
"' Brown was apprehended in the City of Wickliffe, Ohio, located in Lake
County. East Cleveland, Ohio, is located in Cuyahoga County. which is west of
Lake County.
"T Journal entry, City of Wickliffe v. Brown, Case No. S-13799 (Willoughby,
Ohio Mun. Ct. Dec. 10, 1973).
118 Complaint, City of East Cleveland v. Brown, Case No. 158984 (East
Cleveland, Ohio Mun. Ct. Dec. 11, 1973).
" The theft statute, former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(A) (Page 1973),
provided that "[n]o person shall steal any motor vehicle." Id. (repealed Jan. 1,
1974).
'" The joyriding statute, former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(D) (Page
1973), provided that "[n]o person shall purposely take, operate, or keep any motor
vehicle without the consent of its owner." Id. (repealed Jan. 1, 1974).
"' Brief for Defendant in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea at 1, State v.
Brown, No. CR-12062 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P., filed April 12, 1974).
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tinuous offense." Further urging the adoption of a same transaction
test, he pled the conviction for joyriding as former jeopardy. '23 In its
brief in opposition, the prosecution argued that Brown committed two
offenses and that jeopardy never attached with respect to the theft of-
fense because the municipal court was without jurisdiction over such of-
fense. '24 In addition, the prosecution urged that the same act could con-
stitute separate offenses under Ohio law. '25 In reply, Brown asserted, in-
ter alia, that newly enacted section 2941.25(A) required that his motion
to withdraw the guilty plea be granted. '26 The common pleas court over-
ruled the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and Brown was
convicted.'2
On direct appeal to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals, Brown
asserted that he was unconstitutionally prosecuted twice for the same
offense.'28 Preserving his allied offense argument, Brown further
asserted that both the statute and Ohio case law required that the two
crimes be merged.'29 In response to these contentions, the state argued
that Brown was not formerly placed in jeopardy for the theft offenses,'30
and that the two convictions were not precluded as a matter of state law
by the doctrine of merger.'"' In its brief, the state did not attempt to
contradict Brown's contention that he was entitled to the benefit of the
Allied Offense Statute.' 2
The court of appeals determined from the statutes creating the two
offenses that joyriding was a lesser offense included within the offense
122 Id. at 1-3.
123 Id. at 2.
12 Brief for State of Ohio in Opposition to Motion to Change Plea and Dismiss
Indictment at 2, State v. Brown, No. CR-12062 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P.,
filed June 10, 1974).
125 Id.
12 Reply of Defendant to Brief Opposing Motion to Change Plea and Dismiss
Indictment at 3-4, State v. Brown, No. CR-12062 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P.,
filed June 23, 1974).
'2 Brown was sentenced to six months in jail for auto theft, a felony offense.
The sentence was suspended, Brown was ordered to pay court costs and was placed
on probation for one year. The sentence was journalized on December 18, 1974,
almost twelve months after the Allied Offense Statute went into effect.
123 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3-9, State v. Brown, No. 34316 (Ohio 8th
Dist. Ct. App., filed March 4, 1975) [hereinafter "Brief of Appellant"].
12 Id. at 12.
130 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, State v. Brown, No. 34316 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct.
App., filed May 8, 1975).
13, Id. at 7.
132 In footnote six of his appellate brief Brown argued he was entitled to the
benefit of the Allied Offense Statute because it sounded in procedure, and was in
effect when he was indicted by the Grand Jury. Brief of Appelhint, supra note
128, at 12.
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of auto theft.133 It also concluded that the municipal court had jurisdiction
over the joyriding charge, and that joyriding and auto theft were the
same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 134 Nevertheless, the court
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.35  Citing
Blockburger's same evidence test, the court unanimously concluded that
the convictions for joyriding and auto theft did not offend double jeop-
ardy because the convictions were not "premised on the same operative
act."'36 In the course of its opinion, the court of appeals emphasized that
the charges arose out of two separate acts nine days apart.'37 The court
never mentioned Brown's allied offense argument and was convinced
that joyriding and auto theft were not parts of a single episode. The
court reasoned that "[t]he doctrine of merger precludes separate
sentences on multiple convictions when the convictions are based upon
the same act .... [Here] the two convictions were based on two distinct
acts and not the same act; therefore, the doctrine of merger is inap-
plicable."'38 In effect, the court of appeals sanctioned the division of
Brown's criminal episode into temporal units in much the same manner
as the Ohio Supreme Court later did in Barnes. A notice of appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court was filed, but the court dismissed the appeal sua
sponte on the ground that the case failed to present a substantial con-
stitutional question.'39 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Brown asserted that he was twice
"' State v. Brown, No. 34316, slip op. at 4 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 31,
1975).
134 Id.
'3' Id. at 5.
' Id. at 3, 5.
'3 Id. at 5.
' Id. In his Motion for Reconsideration, State v. Brown, No. 34316 (Ohio 8th
Dist. Ct. App., filed Dec. 19, 1975), Brown assailed the court of appeals analysis,
stating:
[Bioth charges do grow out of the same act. Both the charge of theft and
operating continued from November 29th to December 8th, 1973 and
constituted one continuous act. It is impossible for either offense to have
ceased sometime in between those two dates and then subsequently
resume and thereby constitute a separate offense(s) ....
Under the Court's reasoning each infinitesimal instant between
November 29th to December 8th, 1973 could constitute a separate of-
fense of either auto theft or operating or both. Surely the Fifth Amend-
ment bar to twice in jeopardy [sic] does not permit such a result.
Id. at 1-2. The motion for reconsideration was overruled.
" State v. Brown, No. 76-224 (Ohio Sup. Ct. March 19, 1976). In both the trial
court and court of appeals, Brown asserted that his second conviction violated
both state and federal double jeopardy principles. Presumably, the Ohio Supreme
Court's determination that Brown's appeal presented no substantial constitu-
tional issue encompassed both the state and federal constitutions.
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prosecuted and convicted for the same offense in violation of the federal
double jeopardy clause. 4 ' Brown further asserted that under the court
of appeals' strained same evidence analysis a single course of conduct
could be improperly split into both greater and lesser offenses so long
as neither charge covered the same period of time as the other.' In the
course of his argument, Brown twice emphasized the court of appeals
failure to expressly treat the allied offense issue raised by section
2941.25.42 In an attempt to refute Brown's arguments, the state
asserted that the offenses, committed nine days apart, were not the
same for double jeopardy purposes because each required "proof of a
fact which the other does not."'4 The state attempted to undermine
Brown's reliance on the Allied Offense Statute by arguing that the
statute constituted "an allowance for permissive joinder" which did not
require the state to join all counts arising out of the same transaction in
a single trial. 4
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals. Emphasizing that the fifth amendment forbids successive
prosecution and cumulative punishment for both a greater and lesser in-
cluded offense, the Supreme Court treated as conclusive the court of ap-
peals finding that joyriding was an offense included within the offense
of auto theft as a matter of state lawY.5 But the Court went on to reject
the court of appeals conclusion that Brown's conduct was punishable as
two separate and distinct crimes committed nine days apart:
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that
prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units....
The applicable Ohio statutes, as written and as construed in this
case, make the theft and operation of a single car a single of-
fense. . . . [Tihe specification of different dates in the two
charges on which Brown was convicted cannot alter the fact that
he was placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth AmendmentsY.4 6
40 Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
14 Id. at 11.
142 Id. at 6-7 n.3, 20 n.20.
43 Brief for Respondent State of Ohio at 14, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
1 Id. at 26-27 n.16.
1"5 432 U.S. at 167.
"' Id. at 169-70 (footnote and citations omitted).
Both Brown and In re Nielsen preclude the imposition of multiple punishment
for lesser and greater included continuing offenses through the device of indict-
ing the defendant for committing the offenses at different points in time. The
Court has in other cases reversed convictions for lesser included offenses on non-
constitutional grounds.
In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), the defendant was convicted of
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In a revealing footnote, the Supreme Court indicated that the unit of
prosecution issue was at the heart of the double jeopardy question:
We would have a different case if the Ohio Legislature had pro-
vided that joyriding is a separate offense for each day in which a
motor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent .... We
also would have a different case if in sustaining Brown's second
conviction the Ohio courts had construed the joyriding statute
to have that effect. We then would have to decide whether the
state courts' construction, applied retroactively in this case, was
such "an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal
statute" as to violate due process. See Bouie v. City of Columbia,
... cf. In re Snow . .. Crepps v. Durden .... ."
bank robbery and of illegally receiving, possessing and disposing of the stolen
money in violation of two separate statutory provisions. On appeal to the
Supreme Court the conviction for receiving and disposing of the money was
reversed on statutory grounds because the Court found no congressional intent
"to pyramid penalties for lesser offenses following the robbery." Id. at 419. In
Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961), the defendant, her husband and
others conspired to break into a federal commissary. On the night of the break-in,
the defendant waited outside the commissary in an automobile as the others
broke into the building. While the others were still inside, the defendant drove
away. When the others observed that the defendant was no longer outside, they
buried the stolen money and departed. Seventeen days later the defendant
returned to the commissary to get some of the stolen money. She was later con-
victed as an accomplice to the theft and was convicted of illegally receiving, con-
cealing or retaining the money with the intent to convert it to her own use. On
appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant was improperly con-
victed of both stealing and receiving the same stolen property. Relying upon its
decision in Heflin, the Court was unable to conclude that Congress intended to
punish each offense separately. Id. at 554-55. In a dissent joined by three other
members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the defendant could
have properly been convicted of both charges. Distinguishing the Heflin case on
its facts, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The case before us presents a totally different situation -not a coin-
cidental or even a contemporaneous transaction, in the loosest concep-
tion of contemporaneity. Here we have two clearly severed transactions.
The case against the defendant-and the only case-presented two
behaviors or transactions by defendant clearly and decisively separated
in time and in will. ...
It surely is fair to say that in the common understanding of men such
disjointed and discontinuous behaviors by Mrs. Milanovich... cannot be
regarded as a single, merged transaction in any intelligible use of
English.
Id. at 559. The Milanovich dissent illustrates that the division of a criminal
episode into temporal units for purposes of separate prosecutions continues to
fuel the multiple punishment controversy at all judicial levels.
The Nielsen, Brown, Heflin and Milanovich cases demonstrate the inter-
relatedness of the constitutional "same offense" analysis and the non-
constitutional legislative intent analysis.
" 432 U.S. at 169 n.8 (citations omitted).
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The significance of the Supreme Court's holding in Brown takes on a
clearer dimension in light of the dissent's analysis.
Justice Blackmun and two other members of the Court dissented,
sharply criticizing the majority for "taking advantage of the opportun-
ity to pronounce some acceptable but hitherto unenunciated (at this
level) double jeopardy law." '148 Emphasizing that the court of appeals'
decision turned on the fact that the two prosecutions arose out of two
incidents nine days apart, Justice Blackmun refused "to ignore as easily
as the Court does ... the specific finding of the Ohio Court of Appeals
that the two prosecutions . . . were based on (Brown's) separate and
distinct acts committed, respectively, on November 29 and December 8,
1973."' In the course of the dissent, Justice Blackmun stated:
It strains credulity to believe that petitioner was operating the
vehicle every minute of those nine days. A time must have come
when he stopped driving the car .... Only if the (double jeop-
ardy clause) requires the Ohio courts to hold that the allowable
unit of prosecution is the course of conduct would the Court's
result be correct."
The majority in Brown determined that for purposes of double jeopardy
the offenses had a continuing duration and the evidence was insufficient
to permit more than one conviction. The dissent maintained that there
was sufficient evidence to warrant two prosecutions primarily because
it held a relatively more narrow view of the duration of the respective
crimes.
Although it seems that the Brown Court felt constitutionally com-
pelled to reject the Ohio courts conclusion that there were two separate-
ly triable and punishable offenses demonstrated by the evidence, it is
unclear whether the Brown Court considered the Allied Offense Statute
in arriving at its conclusion. However, it is clear that the United States
Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Ohio courts had failed to
give sufficient consideration to the unit of prosecution established by
the Ohio legislature for each crime and that such failure had constitu-
tional ramifications. Had the Ohio courts adequately considered the
units of prosecution prescribed by the statutes, the fifth amendment
issue in Brown might have been avoided entirely through the non-
constitutional device of statutory construction.
B. A Proposed Three-Tier Allied Offense Analysis
Although State v. Logan,"5 ' State v. Barnes,"2 and other cases,'53
,, Id. at 170-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
,4 Id. at 171.
Id. at 171-72.
,5, 60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
,52 68 Ohio St. 2d 13, 427 N.E.2d 517 (1981).
15 In State v. Moralevitz, 70 Ohio App. 2d 20, 433 N.E.2d 1280 (1980), the court
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establish a two-tier analysis for the resolution of allied offense issues,
the Brown decision points to the need to add an intermediate tier to the
analysis, either as a matter of state law or constitutional necessity. Such
an intermediate step in the analysis would force courts to consider the
evidence in light of the units of prosecution prescribed by the pertinent
statutes before determining whether allied offenses were committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each. Use of such a three-tier
analysis to resolve allied offense issues would not only eliminate much
of the confusion now associated with the statute, but would also produce
more predictable and consistent results.
On its face, the two-tier analysis does not force the courts to consider
the various units of prosecution established by the statute or statutes
explained the two-tier analysis in the following manner:
[T]he determination of an allied offense question is a two-step process.
The first step is a statutory analysis whereby the elements of the ap-
plicable statutes are reviewed and a determination made as to whether
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import. Offenses of similar im-
port are those which have similar elements, common elements or of-
fenses whose elements correspond to such a degree that the commission
of one offense will result in the commission of the other. If the offenses
are not allied offenses of similar import, the inquiry is concluded. If the
offenses are found to be allied offenses of similar import, then the second
step of the inquiry must be undertaken and this constitutes a review of
the evidence and a determination made as to whether the offenses were
committed separately or with a separate animus as to each. If the of-
fenses were so committed, they cannot be allied offenses and the defen-
dant may be convicted of all of them. If, however, the offenses were com-
mitted together with a single animus, they are allied offenses and only
one conviction can result.
Id. at __, 433 N.E.2d at 1284.
In Moralevitz, the defendant was indicted for three counts of gross sexual im-
position for putting his hand on the victim's chest, for putting his finger between
her legs and for putting his tongue between her legs. At trial, the evidence failed
to demonstrate how much time elapsed during the commission of these offenses,
but did demonstrate that the victim was kidnapped less than two hours. Finding
the acts to have been committed "separately," within the meaning of Ohio Revised
Code § 2941.25(B), the appellate court rejected the defendant's allied offense
argument and affirmed all three convictions. The court did not analyze the unit of
prosecution prescribed by the gross sexual imposition statutes, § 2907.06 and
§ 2907.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code. Section 2907.06 provides, in part:
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the
spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to
have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other per-
sons, to have sexual contact when any of the following apply:
(3) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thir-
teen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of such
person.
Section 2907.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code defines "sexual contact" as "any
touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh,
genitals, buttocks, pubic region, or if such person is female, a breast, for the pur-
pose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person."
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defining the respective crimes. As a consequence, courts following the
two-tier analysis too often find themselves seizing upon evidence of
temporally separate conduct to sustain separate convictions. Where this
occurs without regard to the units of prosecution established for the of-
fenses by the legislature, the two-tier analysis raises the spector of con-
stitutional infirmity. At a minimum, the two-tier analysis increases the
possibility that a shotgun conviction will result in the imposition of
more than one punishment for the same offense, in violation of the
federal, if not the state, double jeopardy clause.
Under the proposed three-tier analysis, if a court concludes from the
elements of the various crimes that the case involves "allied offenses of
similar import" or "offenses of the same or similar kind," the court
should next consider the nature and duration of the criminal "animus"
incident to each unit of prosecution prescribed by the statutes defining
the offenses. In determining whether it is an act or a course of conduct
which is forbidden by a particular statute, the courts should be guided
by the rule of lenity established by Ohio Revised Code section
2901.04(A) in resolving unit of prosecution questions where legislative
intent is unclear.'54 Only after the court determines whether it is a single
act or a course of conduct proscribed by the legislature should it pro-
ceed under the third step of the analysis to determine whether the
evidence demonstrates that the offenses were committed separately or
with a separate animus as to each.
The allied offense decisions that produce results more consistent with
the legislative purpose to avoid shotgun convictions reflect an implicit,
or even unknowing, consideration of the unit of prosecution issue. In
State v. Cartellone'55 the defendant fired three shots at a single victim
from a moving car and was convicted on three counts of felonious
assault. Two of the three convictions were reversed on appeal pursuant
to the Allied Offense Statute. The appellate court determined that
although the shots were fired separately, there existed only a single
animus for all the shots."6 The rapid firing of three separate shots at a
single victim in Cartellone did not constitute three separately convict-
'M OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (Page 1982} provides that "[slections of
the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed
against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused." Id.
15 No. 43711 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1981) (Cuyahoga County) (currently
being published).
156 The state in Cartellone argued that the mere fact that the defendant's
shots might have injured other persons behind the defendant's intended victim
was sufficient to support all three convictions pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
§ 2941.25. Rejecting this contention, the Cartellone court stated:
[The defendant] argues that under § 2941.25 the state failed to
demonstrate that he had a separate animus necessary to support convic-
tions for all three charges of felonious assault. We agree. R.C.
§ 2941.25(B) states that when defendant's conduct "results in two or
more offenses of the same ...kind committed separately or with a
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able offenses for the same reason that the baking of four loaves of bread'
on the same Sunday did not constitute four separately punishable of-
fenses in Crepps v. Durden.'57 The result in Cartellone is correct
because all three shots were clearly fired in the course of a single
assaultive episode, and because it was less than clear that the legis-
lature intended to convict and punish the defendant separately for each
shot under the circumstances.'58
In one recent case, State v. Woods, the court implicitly recognized the
critical nature of the relationship between double jeopardy issues, allied
offense issues and unit of prosecution issues.'59 In Woods,' the police
stopped an automobile in which the defendants were riding and dis-
covered three loaded revolvers concealed beneath the front seat of the
car. Upon conviction for three counts of illegally carrying a concealed
weapon, each defendant was sentenced to three consecutive terms of im-
prisonment. In disposing of the defendants' double jeopardy argument,
separate animus as to each.... the defendant may be convicted of all of
them ...."
"Animus" has been defined as "purpose, or more properly, immediate
motive ......
Where no "separate animus" for multiple counts of the same crime
can be shown, it must still be determined under the statute that the of-
fenses were not committed "separately." In our case, [the defendant]
fired three successive gunshots .... We hold under these facts that [the
defendant's] conduct constituted one continuous sequence of acts and
that in the absence of a showing of a separate animus, multiple convic-
tions would be a violation of § 2941.25 ....
[T]here is no evidence that, [the defendant] had any purpose or motive
to harm anyone beside [his victim]. Nor is there any evidence that he had
any knowledge of the presence of [bystanders] in the doorway. Since
there was no consequential harm resulting to these two innocent
bystanders, we cannot transfer the animus to harm [the victim] to [the
bystanders], as we would have been called upon to decide had either [of
the bystanders] been struck, in view of the well-established legal doc-
trine that a defendant is responsible for the natural and probable se-
quence of his acts.
Accordingly, we find the "in substances and effect" [sic] [the defen-
dant] committed only one offense of felonious assault.
Id., slip op. at 8-10 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
Had the Cartellone court failed to implicitly examine the legislatively intended
unit of conviction, it might have fallen prey to the misguided analysis of Barnes
and, without reference to animus, mechanically divided the defendant's conduct
by reasoning that each shot exposed the victim to a "separate" risk of harm. Cf.
State v. Barnes, 68 Ohio St. 2d 13, 427 N.E.2d 517 (1981).
"' 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
158 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(A)(2) (Page 1982) provides that "[n]o person
shall knowingly ... [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by
means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance . ..."
"' State v. Woods, No. 44286, slip op. at 8 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 18,
1982) (Cuyahoga County).
160 Id.
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the court of appeals immediately proceeded to inspect the language and
committee comment of the pertinent statute to determine the unit of
prosecution for illegal possession of deadly weapons. Construing the
weapons statute strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
defendants, the court vacated two of the weapons convictions and con-
cluded that the simultaneous, undifferentiated possession of multiple
firearms constituted but a single offense.'"' In the course of its treat-
ment of the double jeopardy and unit of prosecution issues, the court
fortified its decision by noting that dividing "singular conduct into
multiple offenses is prohibited by R.C. 2941.25(A) .... When a defendant
conceals several weapons in one location at one time, his conduct is
essentially one continuous, indivisible act .... Therefore, defendants'
convictions for three separate counts of carrying concealed weapons
conflicts with the provisions of R.C. 2941.45(A)."'' 2 Although the Woods
court discussed the unit of prosecution issue in the context of the defen-
dants' double jeopardy argument, it is apparent that the court was
aware of the relationship between the unit of prosecution and allied
offense issues. As a consequence, the decision in Woods enhanced the
legislative intent to avoid shotgun convictions.
The intended protection of the Allied Offense Statute was recognized
in three Ohio Court of Appeals decisions. In State v. Nash,'3 State v.
Davis'" and State v. Stewart,' the court reversed convictions for gross
sexual imposition committed without a separate animus immediately
before or after the commission of rape. In each case, the court recognized
the significance of the fact that the separate acts of the defendant of-
fered as proof of the greater and lesser offenses occurred within the
context of a single uninterrupted assaultive episode. 6 Implicit in these
Id. at 12.
162 Id. at 11-12 (footnote and citations omitted).
" No. 41450 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1980) (Cuyahoga County).
16 No. 42610 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1981) (Cuyahoga County).
" No. 44331 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1981) (Cuyahoga County).
"' In the course of its opinion, the Nash court stated:
[The defendant-appellant] was apparently charged with the one count of
violating R.C. 2907.02 for engaging in vaginal intercourse .... and one
count of violating R.C. 2907.05 for fondling her vagina with his fingers.
The facts indicate one uninterrupted assaultive episode consisting of
three separate and distinct sexual acts. Appellant argues that these acts
are allied offenses of similar import for which he may receive only one
conviction. Appellee, (the state] argues that appellant had a separate
animus for each offense, that is, he thrice sought sexual gratification
through three separate unlawful acts. Appellee contends that since the
fondling occurred subsequent to, rather than in furtherance of, the
vaginal intercourse, that the allied offenses rule does not apply.
R.C. 2941.25 is designed to prevent multiple convictions for a single
criminal offense. However, it does not prevent multiple convictions for
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decisions is the recognition that the statutory offenses by definition had
duration. These three decisions are in harmony with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Nielsen'67 and Brown. Each decision recognizes that
lesser offenses may be incident to greater continuing offenses, and that
it is unfair to repeatedly prosecute or punish a defendant for both by
temporally subdividing a single criminal episode.
Perhaps more than any of the others, the recent decision in State v.
Wallace'68 furthers the legislative purpose of the Allied Offense Statute.
In Wallace, the court determined that a single shot fired at two police
officers did not constitute more than one punishable offense. Although
the appellate court was seemingly aware that under Ohio law a single
unlawful act that kills or injures two persons constitutes two separately
triable offenses,169 it went on to conclude that there was insufficient
evidence "that the appellant possessed a separate animus to injure each
of the two officers involved ... .""0 Although two victims were involved,
the result in Wallace is a natural and logical extension of Logan's
animus analysis. The court in Wallace not only considered the unit of
prosecution prescribed by the legislature, but also considered the
nature and duration of the single animus common to each of the units of
prosecution. Of all the cases, Wallace probably goes the furthest to
alleviate the potential for injustice inherent in the same evidence
analyses of Ebeling v. Morgan7' and Blockburger v. United States.'
From this perspective, if from no other, the result in Wallace is quite
correct.
Like the analysis of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Brown, the two-tier
allied offense analysis fails to confront explicitly the unit of prosecution
issues which arise in many multiple punishment cases. Carried to logical
limits, the Barnes analysis 7 ' presents the potential for the carving up of
nearly any criminal episode into a plethora of separately convictable
offenses. Because the unit of prosecution issue is not squarely con-
fronted, the two-tier analysis only tends to defeat the legislative pur-
pose to avoid shotgun convictions. Further, such analysis is arguably
multiple offenses merely because they are similar in nature or prox-
imate in time .... In the present case, all three acts occurred within 15
to 20 minutes, during which time appellant was continuously engaged in
his attack upon his victim. There is insufficient evidence of a separate
animus. On this record, these acts are allied offenses of similar import,
which may only sustain one conviction and sentence.
No. 41450, slip op. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
167 In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
'" No. 44333 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1982) (Cuyahoga County).
... Id. slip op. at 12-13 n.12.
170 Id. at 15.
1 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
172 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
' ' See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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subject to judicial manipulation and can easily produce harsh and incon-
sistent results with only slight and relatively insignificant variations in
the evidence.
The addition of an intermediate step to the two-tier allied offense
analysis is not only logical but necessary. The adoption of a three-tier
analysis in allied offense cases would in time produce better reasoned
decisions and more consistent results. It would afford a defendant
greater due process protection by putting him on better notice of the
consequences of his criminal conduct, and it would give the legislature a
more informed control over the criminal justice system. Such an
analysis would lessen the potential for abuse of unpopular defendants.174
By producing more predictable results, a three-tier analysis would
enable both defendants and prosecutors to weigh and balance more ac-
curately the relative risks during plea bargain negotiations. Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, a three-tier analysis would decrease the risk
of multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy guarantee.
The courts' continuing failure to address unit of prosecution issues in
allied offense cases will continue to leave unanswered many questions
implicating constitutional rights under both the Ohio and federal double
jeopardy clauses. Such failure may also result in the multiplication of
convictions not intended by the legislature which, conceivably, might
constitute cruel and unusual punishment through the disproportional
punishment of a single crime as several offenses.
V. JUDICIAL MULTIPLICATION OF CONVICTIONS COULD
CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The Allied Offense Statute should not be viewed as a vehicle which,
by its terms alone, results in punishment repugnant to the eighth
amendment."' It was enacted to prevent multiplication of convictions
when only a single continuous crime was committed. However, if a court
were to misapply the Allied Offense Statute, that is, apply it in a way
that resulted in multiplication of convictions not intended by the
legislature, then misapplication of Ohio Revised Code section 2941.25
could easily constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Apart from cases involving the death penalty, the jurisprudence
developed under the eighth amendment is meager when compared to
"7 Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 163 (1959) (Court upheld state convic-
tion of defendant for same robbery of which he was acquitted in federal court,
Black, J., in dissent, argued that victims of double prosecutions will be the poor,
weak, and religious, political, or racial minorities); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 171 (1873) (where the Court quotes with approval Commonwealth v.
Olds, 15 Ky. 104, 106, 5 Litt. 137, 139 (Ky. Ct. App. 1824) to the effect that the
policy behind the double jeopardy provision is protecting the liberty of the
citizen from changes in popular feeling).
"7 The federal constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punish-
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the jurisprudence under other provisions of the Constitution. The gen-
eral test for cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment
is that, although legislatures have wide discretion in ordaining punish-
ment, a punishment so excessive or disproportionate to the offense as to
shock the conscience of a reasonable person is prohibited."'
The intent to punish is an element to be considered in determining
whether there is a violation of the eighth amendment. The reasoning
behind this is that the purpose of the legislature bears on the question
of whether imposition of the punishment is a necessary or rational
means to a permissible end.'77 Thus, a court should carefully consider
the legislative intent behind sentencing statutes when attempting to
fashion a sentence. The sentence must be within the bound of what the
legislature has provided. If the sentence exceeds the severity outlined
by the legislature, then the punishment is cruel and unusual. This must
be so if the power to ordain punishment is a legislative function. For ex-
ample, if the legislature were to establish a sentence of three years and
court imposed five, then two years of the sentence would be void as a
violation of the eighth amendment.
In Roberts v. Collins,'78 the defendant brough a writ of habeas corpus
challenging consecutive twenty-year sentences on two counts of com-
mon law simple assault. The state legislature had not established a
punishment for defendant's crime. It had, however, established a max-
ment is contained in the eighth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth
amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Guss v. Bomar, 337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964).
The Ohio Constitution also prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9.
7' Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). The punishment
must also be "proportional" to the offense. The court in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d
136 (4th Cir. 1973), citing Trop, states that "the proportionality concept is not
static, but is a 'progressive' one which 'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' .... Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)." Id. at 140 (foot-
note omitted).
The Supreme Court held in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), that:
[Tihe highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss
of many thousand of dollars ... is not greater [under Philippine law] than
that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item of a public ac-
count. And this contrast shows more than different exercises of
legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in
this case as cruel and unusual.
Id. at 381.
177 Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 197 (9th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, the
nature of the offense involved and the danger the offender poses to society are
key factors in determining whether a particular sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. State v. Freitas, 61 Hawaii 262, 268, 602 P.2d 914, 920 (1979).
178 404 F. Supp. 119 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977).
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imum penalty of fifteen years for the more aggravated offense of assault
with intent to murder. The district court held that although the
legislature had not established a punishment for simple assault, it cer-
tainly could not have intended a more severe punishment than that or-
dained for the more aggravated offense of assault with intent to
murder."9 Thus, that part of the sentence which exceeded the maximum
penalty for the more aggravated offense violated the eighth amendment
as cruel and unusual punishment. 80
According to Roberts, the sentence imposed cannot exceed that in-
tended by the legislature without being cruel and unusual punishment.
The Roberts decision does not stand alone, although cases in this area
are scant. In Willoughby v. Phend,i8 ' the defendant, on petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, challenged his sentence for robbery as exceeding
that prescribed for the more aggravated offense of armed robbery. 8 '
The district court agreed that it would offend the eighth amendment for
someone to be sentenced more severely for a lesser offense than the
more aggravated offense. The court stated that "if a legislature may not
create a greater maximum punishment for a lesser included offense,
then neither may a trial court impose such a sentence." ' The
Willoughby court stressed proportionality of the offense to the punish-
ment in assessing the sentence in the context of the eighth amendment.
Carrying Willoughby and Roberts one step further, if the number of
offenses were to be improperly multiplied, then it follows that the con-
comitant sentence would be grossly disproportional to the actual unit of
criminal conduct.
If the Allied Offense Statute were to become a vehicle of non-legis-
latively intended multiplication of convictions, then those extra convic-
tions, which violated the spirit of section 2941.25, would be excessive
and disproportional to the legislatively intended units of conviction and
hence cruel and unusual. This line of reasoning has not yet been broached
by the courts in Ohio (perhaps advocates have failed to present the
argument). In any event, the eighth amendment deserves consideration
179 Id. at 123.
180 Id. at 124.
1' 301 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ind. 1969). It should be noted that although a
sentence may be successfully attacked as being cruel and unusual, the underlying
convictions are usually left intact. Id. at 646. The situation in which improper
multiplication of conviction results in cruel and unusual punishment has not yet
reached the reported decisions; such a factual setting lends itself easily to double
jeopardy arguments.
11 The maximum statutory sentence for armed robbery was twenty years.
The maximum statutory sentence for robbery was twenty-five years. Id. at 647.
In Willoughby it was the legislature, rather than a court, which had levied a cruel
and unusual punishment, but only to the extent of the five years by which the
robbery sentence exceeded the armed robbery sentence. Id. at 648.
183 Id. at 647.
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in multiple punishment cases. The Allied Offense Statute was, after all,
promulgated as a codification of the common law doctrine of merger,184 a
doctrine which sought to avoid excessive multiplication of convictions
where only a single criminal transaction was involved."'
The Allied Offense Statute may be considered an attempt to avoid the
imposition of disproportional punishment that violates the eighth
amendment. If the Ohio Supreme Court continues to divide criminal con-
duct into temporal units without reference to the units of conviction
outlined in the underlying penal code, as it did in Barnes,8 ' without
reference to Brown, '87 Ohio courts will continue to run the risk of impos-
ing cruel and unusual punishment by judicial fiat, in violation of the
Ohio and federal Constitutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The multiple punishment controversy is ages old and is constantly
evolving. Although the Allied Offense Statute was designed to resolve
multiple punishment issues, Ohio courts have generally failed to ade-
quately address the issue since the statute's enactment. In light of deci-
sions including Crepps'88 Snow,'89 Brown9 ' and Logan,' the statute can
receive a proper construction by the courts only if the terms separately
and separate animus are read in pari materia, each explaining the scope
of the other. It seems unreasonable to believe that the General
Assembly drafted section 2941.25(B) intending to give courts plenary
discretion in determining whether to focus upon the animus of the
defendant or upon temporal division of essentially continuous conduct.
The failure of Ohio courts to squarely confront the multiple punish-
ment issue as it relates to legislatively intended units of conviction has
in some cases resulted in the imposition of relatively severe
punishments for single episodes of criminal conduct. This failure to face
the issue has also resulted in confusing precedent and conflicting
results. The two-tier allied offense analysis developed by Ohio courts is
184 State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 131, 397 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (1979).
185 In Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), the defendant was con-
secutively sentenced under two criminal statutes for entering a bank with the in-
tention of robbing it and robbery. The Supreme Court held that consecutive
sentencing was inappropriate where the legislature had not clearly indicated an
intent to sever the criminal transaction; the "separate" criminal acts merged into
the more aggravated offense of robbery. Id. at 329.
' 68 Ohio St. 2d 13, 427 N.E.2d 517 (1981).
187 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
' 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777).
189 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
'90 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
'.' 60 Ohio St. 2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979).
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the core of the problem because it omits consideration of what consti-
tutes a separately punishable offense.
When the two-tier analysis was developed in Logan, the court was
concentrating on the criminal animus of the accused under the second
tier of the allied offense analysis. A legislatively intended result would
be reached in most cases if separately or with separate animus were
read in pari materia, with focus upon animus. Cases decided subsequent
to Logan, however, failed to fully appreciate Logan's precedential value.
Brown specifically condemned arbitrary division of conduct into tem-
poral units, yet the court in Barnes found it expedient to latch upon the
word separately to give Logan's emphasis on the animus of the accused
unctuous treatment, and to divide the continuous criminal episode into
temporal units vis-a-vis the two-tier analysis.
It is necessary to implement the three-tier analysis suggested in Sec-
tion IV of this Article to resurrect the intended protection of the Allied
Offense Statute. The three-tier analysis, which incorporates specific con-
sideration of legislatively intended units of conviction, is necessary to
insure that the Allied Offense Statute is applied within its intended con-
text. Without consideration of the units of conviction, the phrase
separately or with separate animus has little meaning. Any judicial
tendency to impose multiple sentences, where only one is appropriate
due to the continuity of the conduct, could only be lessened by requiring
close scrutiny of the conduct condemned by the legislature in defining
the substantive crimes.
Whether the initiative for change will come from the courts or the
legislature remains to be seen. If Ohio courts continue to employ the
two-tier allied offense analysis, convictions permitted under such
analysis will remain suspect in view of the constitutional guarantees of
the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments.
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